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Abstract
Our aim is for Wibson to be a blockchain-based, decentralized data
marketplace that provides individuals a way to securely and anony-
mously sell information in a trusted environment. The combination
of the Wibson token and blockchain-enabled smart contracts hopes
to allow Data Sellers and Data Buyers to transact with each other di-
rectly while providing individuals the ability to maintain anonymity
as desired.
Wibson intends that its data marketplace will provide infrastructure
and financial incentives for individuals to securely sell personal in-
formation without sacrificing personal privacy. Data Buyers receive
information from willing and actively participating individuals with
the benefit of knowing that the personal information should be accu-
rate and current.
Keywords: Information market, data marketplace, blockchain, smart
contract, data privacy
1 Introduction
We propose a new market-based approach that leverages the latest developments
in blockchain, cryptography and market design to level the playing field between
data consumers (companies, organizations) and data owners (essentially, individ-
uals).
Wibson is a blockchain-based, decentralized data marketplace that provides the
infrastructure for individuals to securely and anonymously sell personal infor-
mation that is validated for accuracy [1]. Wibson is built up on a set of core
principles: transparency, anonymity, fairness, censorship resistant, and the indi-
vidual’s ultimate control over the use of their personal information.
The design and price of information in data markets is an active field of study [2,
3]. In the Wibson marketplace that we describe here, citizens will be able to
participate in an efficiently functioning, decentralized marketplace that provides
both financial incentives and control over their personal information, all without
sacrificing privacy.
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2 Marketplace Definitions
Definition 2.1. A Data Marketplace (DM) is a platform for the trade of infor-
mation which provides:
– The infrastructure for a free market whereby parties engage in exchange:
sellers offering their data in exchange for money from buyers.
– Allow any data tradeable item to be evaluated and valued.
– Incentives for all players to be honest, and an enforcement system to take
actions if a dishonest behavior is chosen.
– Incentives for all players to ensure that data is trustworthy, and to provide
quality data with the addition of an enforcement system to ensure this.
Definition 2.2. A Decentralized Data Marketplace (dDM) is a DM such that:
– There is no central authority which regulates the participants of the market.
– There is no central data repository. The users who generate the data are
the owners of the data, and keep their data in their own devices having full
control of their data assets.
– There is no central funds repository, therefore providing a trustless system
where actors do not have to entrust their funds to a third party.
Definition 2.3. A Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Data Marketplace (dPDM)
is a dDM which allows users to sell private information, while providing them the
following privacy guarantees:
– Participants anonymity: the identity of the Sellers and Buyers is not re-
vealed, without their consent. In particular, the identity of the Data Seller
is not revealed to the Data Buyer, without the consent of the Data Seller.
– Transparency over Data usage: the Data Seller has always visibility on how
his Data is used by the Buyer.
– Control over Data usage: the Data Seller can modify the rights over its
Data at any time.
3 Wibson: a Decentralized Data Marketplace
In this section, we present the Wibson Decentralized Data Marketplace, which is
inspired by the dPDM definitions, while allowing for trade-offs that are practical
and necessary to ensure a market adapted to today’s industry structure.
3.1 Marketplace participants
The protocol is conducted by three types of market participants: Data Sellers,
Data Buyers, and Notaries.
Data Seller: The Seller owns data and has rights to sell that data. The typical
case is an individual selling his/her personal data.
Data Buyer: Any entity who wants to purchase data. Typically the Buyer is an
organization intending to train Machine Learning algorithms and models
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by using the data acquired.
Notary: We introduce the role of Notary as a verification system to verify partic-
ipants information when required, verify data quality and trustworthiness
when required, and arbitrate in case of conflict between Data Sellers and
Data Buyers.
To qualify as a Notary, the Notary must have access to ground truth infor-
mation with respect to the data being exchanged in the marketplace. In
other words, the Notary will be an entity with information from their own
files on the Data Sellers and will be able to verify it.
We say that the marketplace is decentralized since any participant which qual-
ifies can enter the marketplace as Data Seller, Data Buyer or Notary. There is no
central authority which controls the participation in the market, or gives/denies
permission to act in the market. This is a clear contrast with most common
marketplaces, controlled by a central authority.
3.2 Protocol description
We present here the mechanisms and flow of operations of the Wibson protocol.
The normal flow of operations is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Wibson’s normal flow of operations.
1. The Data Buyer B creates a Data Order query DO = 〈A,R, PKB, UB,ma, tc〉
and sends it to all the Notaries he wants to include, in order to obtain their
fees, terms of service for the DO and their signatures over all this informa-
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tion in agreement with the conditions described by the Data Buyer. The
DO includes:
(i) intended audience A (filter of potential sellers),
(ii) data requested R,
(iii) the Data Buyer’s public key PKB,
(iv) public URL to upload Data Seller’s responses and encrypted data via
HTTPS post UB,
(v) minimum audit budget ma,
(vi) terms and conditions of data use tc.
2. The Data Buyer sends the Data Order to the smart contract adding also
the list of notaries with their fees, terms of service and signatures L =
{Nk1 , . . . ,Nks}. The Data Buyer also sets the price p that he will pay
for each Data Response to the Data Order. The tokens (corresponding to
minimum audit budget ma) leave the Data Buyer’s control.
3. Sellers monitor Data Orders and look for opportunities where they:
(i) match Data Order’s audience A,
(ii) agree on data requested R,
(iii) accept suggested Notary (only one),
(iv) accept the Data Order price p,
(v) accept terms and conditions of data use.
4. Data Sellers may send Data Responses to Data Buyer’s public URL (off-
chain).
Data Response DR =
〈
Ei,DO, p, σi, H(σi||Di),N ∗i , tc, sigSi
〉
includes:
(i) address Ei to receive the payments,
(ii) the Data Order’s address DO,
(iii) the price p of the Data Order (for which they are willing to sell re-
quested data),
(iv) hash of unencrypted data Di prepended with a random salt σi, com-
puted using SHA-256 [4]: 〈σi, H(σi||Di)〉 ,
(v) selected Notary N ∗i ∈ L who is included in the list of Notaries L who
have signed.
(vi) link to the accepted terms and conditions of data use tc,
(vii) the Data Seller’s signature over all of the above sigSi (to add in the
blockchain).
No Data Seller data is sent at this point.
5. Data Buyer B chooses the set of Data Sellers T from whom he wants to
buy and adds them to the Data Order contract. Tokens to pay Data Sellers
leave the Data Buyer’s control at this point (the selection happens on-chain
in the transaction). The Data Buyer also pays for eventual audits, if the
minimum budget for audit ma was already depleted.
6. Data Sellers listen for approved Data Responses.
7. Data Sellers Si ∈ T who have their offer approved upload the data file
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(encrypted with the public key of the Data Buyer PKB) to the requested
address UB.
8. Once the Data Buyer receives the personal information, the next step is to
close the transaction and transfer the tokens accordingly.
In order to close a Data Response over a Data Order, the Data Buyer must
check with the Notary if the data must be notarized or not. Then the
Notary will hand over to the Data Buyer a signed certificate specifying one
of the following scenarios: (a) the data will not be notarized; (b) the data
was notarized and is valid; (c) the data was notarized and is invalid.
Unless the Data Buyer specifically requests the Notary to audit a Data
Seller, it is up to the Notary to decide which Data Sellers are going to be
notarized.
9. With the Notary’s signed certificate, the Data Buyer can close the given
Data Response (a.k.a. Data Transaction). The contract will verify this
certificate and transfer the money to the Data Seller in scenarios (a) and
(b), or to the Data Buyer in scenario (c).
3.3 Examples of real-world market participants
Bank credit card transactions. Suppose that the Seller is a client of a Bank,
who offers on the market his/her (anonymized) credit card transactions. The
Buyer can be any entity requiring transactional data to train its machine learning
models.
In this case, the Bank is the ideal Notary since the Bank can verify that the Seller
is actually a client of the Bank, by requiring the Seller to provide information
that authenticates him/her. The Bank can act as a Notary in case of conflict,
since it can verify whether the information of credit card transactions sent by the
Seller to the Buyer is valid and trustworthy (in particular, by comparing with
the Bank’s own records of the client’s credit card transactions).
Location data. Suppose that the Seller is a client of a Telecommunications
company, who offers on the market his/her (anonymized) records with location
information. The Buyer can be any entity requiring location data to train its
machine learning models.
In this example, the Telecommunications company (Telco) is the ideal Notary
since the Telco can verify that the Seller is actually a client of the Telco, by
requiring the Seller to provide information that authenticates him/her. The
Telco can act as a Notary in case of conflict, and verify whether the location
information sent by the Seller to the Buyer is valid and trustworthy (in particular,
by comparing with the Telco’s own records of the client’s location when he/she
used mobile phone services).
4 Conclusion
Our aim with the Wibson decentralized marketplace presented here is to restore
the individuals’ ownership over their personal information. The Wibson protocol
will benefit consumers by providing them the ability to control and monetize their
personal information. It will also give access to high quality and verified data to
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organizations which need to train Machine Learning algorithms and models, as
well as an explicit consumer consent mechanism which will be absolutely critical
as new privacy regulations are coming into effect.
In addition to the marketplace protocol, Wibson also provides primitives (not
described here) to solve efficiently the problem of fair exchange [5] by providing an
efficient zero-knowledge contingent payment mechanism [6, 7, 8, 9], reminiscent
of the secure triggers cryptographic primitive [10].
By supporting the principles of transparency, anonymity, fairness and control,
we believe that the Wibson marketplace will gain the people’s trust needed to
develop a vibrant data marketplace, that represents a fundamental change in the
way organizations collect and use personal information for their data science and
business analytics needs.
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